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We use newly constructed state-speciﬁc data to explore the implications of common modeling choices 
for measures of research returns. Our results indicate that state-to-state spillover effects are important, 
that the research and development lag is longer than many studies have allowed, and that misspeciﬁ­
cation can give rise to signiﬁcant biases. Across states, the average of the own-state beneﬁt-cost ratios 
is 21:1, or 32:1 when the spillover beneﬁts to other states are included. These ratios correspond to real 
internal rates of return of 9% or 10% per annum, much smaller than those typically reported in the 
literature, partly because we have corrected for a methodological ﬂaw in computing rates of return. 
In the United States, public support for invest­
ments in agricultural R&D continues to wane 
in spite of consistently high reported rates 
of return to agricultural R&D. This appar­
ent paradox could simply reﬂect government 
failure, but it might also reﬂect skepticism 
about the evidence. Certainly some public pol­
icymakers and some economists—ourselves 
among them—are skeptical about the very high 
rates of return reported by some studies, and 
“gilding the lily” might have damaged the case 
for public support (Alston et al. 2000). 
Data limitations require the imposition of 
restrictive assumptions that have unknown 
implications for estimation bias, but upward 
biases may also have resulted from particular 
modeling choices that were not made necessary 
by data constraints (Alston and Pardey 2001). 
This paper reports the main results from a long-
running project in which we set out to obtain 
new and improved estimates of the returns to 
U.S. public agricultural research and develop­
ment (R&D), to evaluate the role of modeling 
choices versus fundamental factors in inﬂuenc­
ing the ﬁndings and thus to provide a clearer 
understanding of the conﬁdence that can be 
placed in the estimates. 
To explore the consequences of common 
modeling choices and their implications for 
measures of research returns, we make use 
of an uncommonly rich and detailed panel 
of state-level data, which we developed for 
this purpose. It includes annual state-speciﬁc 
data on agricultural productivity for each 
of the 48 contiguous U.S. states over the 
years 1949–2002 and on agricultural research 
and extension expenditures by the federal 
and state governments over the years 1890– 
2002. The indexes of multifactor productiv­
ity (MFP) are Fisher ideal discrete approx­
imations of Divisia indexes that reﬂect a 
careful effort to account for variation over 
time and among states in the composition 
of the aggregates of inputs and outputs and 
thereby minimize the role of index number 
problems. In our econometric models, we pay 
particular attention to the speciﬁcation of the 
research lag structure and models of spa­
tial spillovers, but to illustrate the role of 
fundamental factors, we compare the result­
ing estimates with simple approximations that 
abstract from the detail of the spatial and 
temporal aspects. 
A more complete description of the data, 
models, and many of the results discussed here 
can be found in the study by Alston et al. 
(2010). Beyond presenting a succinct synthe­
sis of the main results found by Alston and 
colleagues, we here extend that work in two 
important ways. First,we present new evidence 
on the time-series properties of the models, 
which provides additional support regarding 
the robustness of the results. Second, we 
present alternative measures of the rate of 
return to the investments, demonstrating why 
many of the previous results in the literature 
should be treated with skepticism. 
Modeling Agricultural Research and 
Productivity 
At the center of our empirical work is a model 
of state-speciﬁc productivity growth as a func­
tion of investments in agricultural research, 
built on foundations laid by Griliches (1964, 
1979) and Evenson (1967), among others, as 
reviewed byAlston,Norton,and Pardey (1998) 
and Alston et al. (2010). Underlying the pro­
ductivity patterns are changes in aggregate 
measures of inputs and outputs. In 2002, U.S. 
agriculture produced 2.6 times the quantity 
of output produced in 1949. It did this with 
marginally less aggregate inputs such that MFP 
grew faster than output. Our estimates indi­
cate that output from agriculture increased on 
average by 1.68% per year over the period 
1949–2002, while inputs used by agriculture 
declined by 0.11% per year; so, measured 
MFP grew by 1.78% per year. These averages 
reﬂect patterns of input and output growth 
that varied dramatically among the 48 con­
tiguous states. Some states had both inputs 
and outputs growing, some had both falling, 
but the majority had output growing against 
a declining input quantity, and all had pos­
itive rates of MFP growth over the years 
1949–2002, which ranged from 0.84% per year 
in Wyoming to 2.48% per year in North 
Carolina. 
Investments in agricultural research and 
extension also evolved dramatically over the 
period of our analysis, with important changes 
both in the emphasis among federal, state, 
and local government and private sources of 
funding and in the balance of effort among per­
forming agencies. We use state-speciﬁc panel 
data on investments in publicly performed 
research since 1890 and in extension since 1915, 
to develop research and extension knowledge 
stocks to be used in models of productivity 
over the years 1949–2002. Over that period 
total expenditure on public research and exten­
sion grew dramatically in total but unevenly. 
The intensities of spending on research and 
extension conducted by state government insti­
tutions have become quite varied, reﬂecting 
differences among states in growth in agri­
cultural production, as well as in their invest­
ments in the creation and diffusion of knowl­
edge. 
Model Structure 
We begin with a model in which agricultural 
productivity in every U.S. state (excluding 
Alaska and Hawaii) depends on past agri­
cultural research and extension conducted by 
itself and every other U.S. state (a total of 
48 states) and intramural research conducted 
by the USDA.1 We can express this model in 
general terms, mathematically, as 
(1) MFPi,t = fi(Rt , Et) 
where MFPi,t is multifactor productivity in 
state i in year t, and Rt is a 49  × (LR + 1) 
matrix in which the typical element, Rj,t−k, 
is the investment in public agricultural R&D 
made by state j (for j = 1, . . . , 48) or the USDA 
(for j = 49) in year t–k; similarly, Et is a 48  × 
(LR + 1) matrix in which the typical element, 
Ej,t−k, is the investment in public agricultural 
extension made by state j in year t–k; LR 
denotes the maximum number of years over 
which a given investment can affect MFP; and 
k varies between zero and LR. 
To implement this model we have to deﬁne 
the knowledge stock variables, which requires 
1 There are various ways to account for R&D activity, but with 
an eye to the policy implications of the results, our intent here is 
to evaluate the impacts of agricultural R&D on a “by performer” 
basis (as distinct from a “by funder” or other basis). The Organisa­
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (2002) provides 
details on the internationally accepted standards for measuring 
R&D spending and performance, which we followed in compiling 
our R&D data. 
jointly deﬁning the spillover relationships 
(which allow for research conducted in one 
state to affect productivity in another) and the 
research lag distributions (which summarize 
the temporal relationship between spending 
and productivity). Even if the research and 
extension lag lengths were modest, they would 
imply an impossibly large number of research 
effects to estimate, so some restrictions must 
be imposed, as has been long recognized in 
studies of returns to R&D. Griliches (1979) 
suggested that 
it is probably best to assume a func­
tional form for the lag distribution on 
the basis of prior knowledge and gen­
eral considerations and not to expect 
the data to answer such ﬁne ques­
tions.That is,a“solution”to the multi­
collinearity problem is a moderation 
of our demands on the data—our 
desires have to be kept within the 
bounds of our means. (p. 106, empha­
sis in original) 
In our particular setting, the potential prob­
lems of multicollinearity and identiﬁcation are 
many times greater than in the typical study 
using a single time series,since we have allowed 
for 48 states with interstate spillovers in every 
direction. 
Previous econometric studies of effects of 
agricultural research on productivity, or rates 
of return to research, have almost invariably 
imposed some structure (often implicitly) to 
reduce the number of lag weights to be esti­
mated and to impose other prior beliefs on the 
shape or length of the lag (see Alston et al. 
2000 for details). Like most previous studies, 
and as advocated by Huffman and Evenson 
(2006a),we impose some restrictions on the lag 
distribution, to reduce the number of param­
eters to be estimated. First, we assume that 
as a baseline model, agricultural research and 
extension expenditures (at least at the margin) 
are fungible and can be combined into a single 
aggregate research and extension variable to 
which the same lag distribution would apply.2 
2 This assumption may appear rather strong, but some aggrega­
tion assumptions are necessary and are always made in work of this 
nature. The research and extension variables themselves represent 
aggregates over different types of activities having different lagged 
impacts on productivity (ranging from relatively basic research to 
applied outreach and advisory services, a signiﬁcant share of which 
may have no relationship to production agriculture, and across dif­
ferent ﬁelds of science that may have more or less relevance to 
production agriculture). We examine the empirical implications of 
Second, we assume that the same-shaped lag 
distribution applies to a state’s research and 
extension, regardless of who is adopting the 
results. Thus, productivity in each of the 48 
states depends on 49 state-speciﬁc knowledge 
stocks (one own-state research stock, 47 other-
state research stocks, and one federal research 
stock). Third, we assume that same lag shape 
applies to all the states within a given model. 
However, we do estimate the parameters that 
deﬁne the shape and effective length of the lag, 
and in that sense our approach is less restrictive 
than others that simply imposed a speciﬁc dis­
tribution a priori (such as the trapezoidal lag 
that was introduced by Huffman and Evenson 
[1993] and has been applied by many others 
since). In addition, we explore the implications 
of relaxing several of the baseline modeling 
assumptions. 
Consequently, in the baseline model, the 
relationship between spending on research and 
extension and the knowledge stock produced 
within state i in year, t, SKi,t , can be character­
ized using a single lag distribution, deﬁned in 
terms of (a) an overall lag length,(b) a gestation 
lag,(c) a functional form (we used a gamma dis­
tribution), and, (d) within the functional form, 
parameters that determine the shape of the 
distribution, as follows:3 
LR 
(2)	 SKi,t = bk(Ri,t−k + Ei,t−k), 
k=0 
where LR is the total lag length, and the bk 
parameters are the lag weights that are deﬁned 
by the alternative lag distributions, and these 
weights sum to one: 
LR 
(3) bk = 1. 
k=0 
this assumption later in the paper when testing the robustness of 
our preferred model. 
3 Our analysis is not conﬁned to this baseline model and its 
particular assumptions. Importantly, unlike previous studies that 
simply impose assumptions about the research and extension lag, 
we examine the implications of alternatives, including the arbitrary 
and untested imposition of a particular, short lag distribution shape 
for extension combined with a speciﬁc trapezoidal lag distribution 
for research, as used by Huffman and Evenson (1993) and others. 
The results, discussed in the paper, did not especially favor the use 
of separate lags for extension, while serving to illustrate the impli­
cations of that choice for the estimated rates of return and the 
difﬁculty of discriminating among such alternatives using the kinds 
of data that are available. 
  
Gamma Lag Distribution Model 
The research lag weights (bk) implied by the 
gamma distribution are: 
(k − g + 1)(δ/1−δ)λ(k−g) 
(4) bk = LR [(k − g + 1)(δ/1−δ)λ(k−g)]
k=0
for LR ≥ k > g; otherwise bk = 0 
where g is the gestation lag before research 
begins to affect productivity, and δ and λ are 
parameters that deﬁne the shape of the dis­
tribution (0 ≤ δ <  1 and 0 ≤ λ<  1). Here, we 
assume a gestation lag of g = 0 years, but sev­
eral distributions deﬁned by combinations of δ 
and λ that we use imply weights very close to 
zero for small values of k, resulting in a longer 
effective gestation lag. In addition, based on 
our own previous experience with similar data 
and models (see, e.g., Pardey and Craig 1989) 
and some limited pretesting as a part of the 
present study, as well as a predisposition to 
allow for generously long lags, we allow for 
LR = 50 years. The resulting lag distribution 
allows for positive contributions to the current 
stock from up to 50 years of past expenditures 
on research and extension, but particular val­
ues of λ and δ can correspond to a pattern of 
very low bk parameters, after a time, that imply 
a much shorter effective maximum lag. Hence, 
the research knowledge stocks are deﬁned as 
LR 
(5) SKi,t = bk(Ri,t−k + Ei,t−k) 
k=0 
(k + 1)(δ/1−δ)λ(k) 
bk = . LR [ J
(k + 1)(δ/1−δ)λ(k)
k=0 
Spillover Weights Based on Similarity of 
Commodity Composition 
Previous studies have imposed various (largely 
untested) assumptions to deﬁne the interstate 
spillover impacts of agricultural research and 
extension investments. As discussed by Alston 
(2002) and Alston et al. (2010), many studies 
simply ignored spatial spillovers, attributing all 
state-speciﬁc impacts to own-state investments, 
while those studies that have allowed for inter­
state spillovers have generally deﬁned spillover 
potential based on physical proximity. Here, as 
a departure from those previous approaches, 
we use a measure of spillover potential based 
on the similarity of the commodity composi­
tion of output between pairs of states, and we 
evaluate the implications of this assumption for 
results compared with the main alternatives.4 
We assume a linear state-to-state spillover 
relationship, and deﬁne 
49 
(6) SSi,t = ωijSKj,t 
jj=i 
where ωij is a spillover coefﬁcient, a weight 
that measures the contribution of a unit of 
the knowledge stock created in state j to the 
knowledge stock used in state i. To deﬁne 
the spillover coefﬁcients, which measure the 
state-to-state spillover potential of agricultural 
research and extension, we borrow and adapt 
an approach introduced by Jaffe (1986) to mea­
sure interﬁrm or interindustry spillover effects. 
The variant used by Jaffe (1989) is closest to 
what we use here. Jaffe (1989) used character­
istics of the patents obtained by ﬁrms to deﬁne 
a measure of technological closeness among 
them. We use the output characteristics of agri­
culture in the different states—representing 
agro-ecological and other relevant economic 
factors—to deﬁne the technological “close­
ness” of states to one another. The vector of 
output (value) shares fi = (fi1, . . .  , fiM ) locates 
state i in M-dimensional technological space. 
The corresponding measure of technological 
spillover potential is deﬁned as: 
 M 
m=1 fimfjm(7) ωij =    1/2  1/2  M  M 
m=1 f 
2 
m=1 f 
2 
im jm
where fim is the value of production of output 
m as a share of the total value of agricul­
tural output in state i such that these shares 
fall between zero and one and sum to one 
(i.e., there are a total of M different outputs 
across the 48 states, and 0 ≤ fim ≤ 1 and Lm 
4 The notion here is that research spillovers among states pro­
ducing similar or identical commodity portfolios are likely to be 
more pronounced than among states producing dissimilar or dis­
tinct sets of agricultural outputs. Thus, two predominantly dairy 
production states are more likely to be doing research of relevance 
to each other than if one state produced only milk and the other 
only oranges. To be sure, dairy (and other) production details vary 
from state to state for a host of reasons, but it is unlikely that the 
dairy research in New York has no application to dairy production 
in Minnesota or California, as would be implied by the geograph­
ical proximity restriction incorporated in the approach used by 
Huffman and Evenson (1993, 2006b), for example. 
fim = 1).5 To deﬁne corresponding “spillover 
coefﬁcients” for measuring the state-speciﬁc 
impacts of USDA research stocks (i.e., ωiF = 
ωi49 , for i = 1, . . . , 48), we apply equation (7) 
to index the similarity of each state’s vector of 
output shares and the national vector of out­
put shares.6 Then,given this speciﬁcation of the 
state-to-state spillover relationships, instead 
of 47 individual other-state knowledge stocks 
and a federal knowledge stock in the regres­
sion model, we use a single research spillover 
stock tailored for each state, to represent the 
aggregation of those 48 spill-in effects in that 
state. 
Econometric Estimation and Results 
Assuming a logarithmic functional form and 
augmenting the model to include state-speciﬁc 
ﬁxed effects and a variable to reﬂect the effect 
of weather, the model becomes 
(8) ln MFPi,t = α0i + αR ln SKi,t + αS ln SSi,t 
+ γ ln PRCi,t + ei,t . 
The variables are deﬁned as follows: 
1. MFPi,t is a Fisher ideal index (i.e., a dis­
crete approximation of a Divisia index) 
of multifactor agricultural productivity in 
state i in year t; 
2. SKi,t is the own-state stock of knowledge 
in state i in year t from own-state spend­
ing on publicly performed agricultural 
research and extension over the previous 
50 years, in real terms; 
5 A referee raised several questions about the structure and 
interpretation of these coefﬁcients related to whether they may 
vary over time and, as a related point, the direction of causality 
(if agricultural R&D affects production patterns, then the weights 
are endogenous). The relevant issues are too many to deal with 
in the space available here, but many of them are discussed in 
some detail by Alston et al. (2010). In the present application, 
we use the average value of ωij for the sample period, which is 
simply a measure of the overall similarity of the agricultural out­
put mix between states, as a proxy for the state-to-state spillover 
potential of agricultural research and extension. We compare the 
model using this speciﬁcation with alternative speciﬁcations similar 
to those typically used in the literature. 
Paraphrasing Jaffe (1989, p. 88), in a sense ωij measures the 
degree of overlap of fi and fj . The numerator will be large when 
states i and j have very similar output mixes. The denominator nor­
malizes the measure to be one when fi and fj are identical. Hence, 
ωij will be zero for pairs of states with no overlap in their output 
mix and one for pairs of states with an identical output mix; and for 
the in-between cases, 0 <ωij < 1. It is conceptually similar to a cor­
relation coefﬁcient. Like a correlation coefﬁcient, it is completely 
symmetric: ωij = ωji , and ωii = 1. 
3. SSi,t is the state-speciﬁc spillover stock of 
knowledge in state i in year t from spend­
ing on agricultural research and extension 
conducted by federal and other-state pub­
lic institutions over the previous 50 years, 
in real terms, constructed using the same 
lag distribution parameters as for SKi,t ; 
4. PRCi,t is a state-speciﬁc pasture and 
rangeland condition index, measured in 
September for each year and published 
by the Economics, Statistics, and Market 
Information System of the USDA; and 
5. ei,t is a residual, with an independent and 
identically distributed structure. 
Simple summary statistics are presented 
in table 1. 
Notably, the speciﬁcation in equation (8) 
does not include any variables to represent 
the stocks of knowledge from private agricul­
tural research conducted in the United States 
or internationally, public agricultural research 
conducted in other countries, or nonagricul­
tural research. The reason for excluding these 
variables is that appropriate data in suitably 
long time series simply are not available. The 
omission of these variables could lead to biases 
in the estimated effects of the included knowl­
edge stocks if the omitted stocks are correlated 
with the included stocks. However, private 
research effects are embodied largely in inputs, 
and to the extent that the beneﬁts are cap­
tured through royalties or the equivalent, they 
might not have much impact on measured pro­
ductivity compared with an equivalent public 
research achievement provided to farmers and 
others for free. In addition,our adjustments for 
changes in input and output quality will have 
dealt with some of these impacts. This view is 
supported to some extent by some recent work 
byHuffmanandEvenson (2006a).7 Even so,we 
are conscious of the potentially biasing effects 
of omitting private agricultural R&D (as well 
as omitting U.S. nonagricultural research and 
7 Most studies of the effects of public agricultural research on 
productivity have not incorporated an explicit measure of private 
research. In a signiﬁcant and rare exception, Huffman and Even-
son (2006a) attempted to account for private research effects in an 
analysis using U.S. state-level data (see also Huffman and Evenson 
1993, 2006b). In the absence of suitably long time series of private 
research expenditures, they used state-speciﬁc production weights 
applied to four classes of commodity-speciﬁc patent data to deﬁne 
state-speciﬁc annual ﬂows of private research outputs, which they 
aggregated into state-speciﬁc stocks by applying trapezoidal lag 
weights over a 19-year period and summing. The resulting measure 
of“private agricultural research capital” did not make a statistically 
signiﬁcant contribution to either of the productivity models that 
Huffman and Evenson (2006a) reported. 
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Table 2. Summary of Results for the Base Model, Top-Ranked Models
 
Model Details Model Results 
Model rank by SSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Lag Distribution Characteristics 
λ 0.70 0.65 0.80 0.75 0.85 0.90 0.60 0.80 
δ 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.90 0.80 
Peak lag year 24 20 24 19 24 27 17 17 
Elasticities with Respect to 
Own-state SAES 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.14 
Own-state extension 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.15 
All own-state combined 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.25 0.29 
SAES spill-ins 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.10 
Intramural spill-ins 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.10 
Extension spill-ins 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.12 
All spill-ins combined 0.24 0.31 0.22 0.30 0.22 0.19 0.36 0.31 
Notes: SSE (sum of squared errors) indicates the goodness of ﬁt of the model. The elasticities are of multifactor productivity with respect to the knowledge stock 
speciﬁed. 
international research), and we explore this 
issue in later sections. 
The models were estimated using various 
estimation procedures in Stata 10.0 with the 
International Science and Technology Prac­
tice and Policy Center (InSTePP) Production 
Accounts, version 4, as described by Pardey 
et al. (2009).8 We used a type of grid-search 
procedure, in which we assigned values for 
the parameters of the gamma lag distribution 
(λ and δ), then constructed the knowledge 
stock variables using these parameters along 
with the expenditures on research and exten­
sion and the spillover coefﬁcients (ωij), and 
then estimated the model using these con­
structed stocks.9 By repeating this procedure 
using different values for λ and δ, we were able 
to search for the values of these parameters 
that, jointly with the estimated values for the 
other parameters,would best ﬁt the data. Com­
bining the following eight possible values for 
both λ and δ (0.60, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85, 
0.90, 0.95), a ﬁxed maximum lag (50 years in 
most cases), and no gestation lag, yields a total 
of 64 possible combinations. A very wide range 
of shapes and effective lag lengths are encom­
passed by the range of parameter values tried. 
8 Version 4 of the InSTePP Production Accounts represents a 
revised and updated version of the data used by Acquaye, Alston, 
and Pardey (2003) and originally developed and used by Craig and 
Pardey (1996). Pardey et al. (2009) provide further details on the 
construction of these data, which are presented and discussed by 
Alston et al. (2010). 
9 This approach of estimating productivity models with precon­
structed research knowledge stocks is standard in much of the 
relevant previous work. Our important departure is to search across 
the range of possibilities for the lag distribution used to construct 
that stock and test among them, rather than simply impose one. 
We initially thought we might conduct a fur­
ther search over a ﬁner grid, but upon review 
of our econometric results with the 64 lag dis­
tributions, we concluded that it would not be 
informative to do so because the top-ranked 
models were nearly indistinguishable. 
The base model treats state-speciﬁc research 
and extension symmetrically, such that the 
same lag weights and spillover coefﬁcients 
apply to both research and extension. This 
model was estimated using ordinary least 
squares with state-speciﬁc intercepts, which is 
a ﬁxed-effects panel data estimator, for each of 
the 64 lag distributions.10 Table 2 summarizes 
the main results for the highest-ranked eight 
models, arranged in order according to crite­
ria of goodness-of-ﬁt (sum of squared errors), 
highest to lowest from left to right. The best-
ﬁtting model was obtained with values for λ = 
0.70 and δ = 0.90, implying a peak lag weight at 
year 24, as seen in ﬁgure 1.11 Among the mod­
els in table 2, the shape of the lag distribution 
was fairly similar across the top-ranked mod­
els compared with other models that did not 
ﬁt as well. The peak lag varied somewhat, but 
the implied values for the elasticities of MFP 
with respect to the various knowledge stocks 
were very similar across the eight models— 
about 0.32 for own-state research and about 
0.24 for spill-ins. 
10 We established that a ﬁxed-effects estimator was preferred to 
a random-effects estimator using Hausman’s (1978) speciﬁcation 
test for ﬁxed or random effects. The results are presented, along 
with additional diagnostic tests, by Alston et al. (2010, table 10-4). 
11 Figure 1 also shows the trapezoidal lag structure used by 
Huffman and Evenson (1993) and many others, plus a parame­
terization of our gamma distribution that closely approximates this 
speciﬁc trapezoidal form. 
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Figure 1. Gamma and Trapezoidal lag distri­
butions. 
Model Diagnostics 
The analysis generally resulted in highly sig­
niﬁcant coefﬁcient estimates; however, we also 
sought to verify the consistency of the esti­
mates after controlling for some additional 
econometric issues. Speciﬁcally, we were con­
cerned with autocorrelation of the residuals 
and unit roots in the state-speciﬁc MFP series, 
which can result in spurious parameter esti­
mates. To address this concern, we reestimated 
the models in ﬁrst-difference form (i.e., with 
all of the variables speciﬁed in logarithmic 
differences and absent an intercept term). In 
most cases ﬁrst-differencing resulted in simi­
larly shaped preferred lag distributions, as well 
as similar estimates of elasticities for a given 
lag distribution shape compared with the base 
models. 
Heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation were not of primary concern given 
the large sample size, the asymptotic properties 
of the estimators, and the statistical signiﬁ­
cance of the coefﬁcient estimates. However, 
we also estimated the full grid of lag dis­
tributions using a feasible generalized least 
squares (FGLS) procedure that corrected for 
heteroskedasticity within states, contempora­
neous correlation among states, and ﬁrst-order 
autocorrelation of the residuals. The estimated 
elasticities from the FGLS estimation proce­
dures were very similar to those from the 
ﬁxed-effects regressions presented in table 2. 
For example, in the base model with the pre­
ferred lag distribution, the elasticity of MFP 
with respect to the own-state knowledge stock 
was 0.311 using an FGLS regression proce­
dure and 0.322 using a ﬁxed-effects regression 
procedure, while the corresponding elastici­
ties with respect to spillover knowledge stocks 
were 0.241 and 0.235, respectively. Given the 
pattern of similarities of the estimates in the 
FGLS models to those in the base ﬁxed-effects 
models, we were fairly certain that any auto-
correlation of the residuals and issues of unit 
roots related to the state-speciﬁc MFP series 
were not substantially affecting the consistency 
of the ﬁxed-effects estimates.12 
Time-Series Properties of the Data 
We also performed a formal statistical anal­
ysis of the time-series properties of the vari­
ables and a check of the consistency of the 
parameter estimates. A visual inspection of 
the data reveals that the series appear to be 
highly nonstationary. However, if the variables 
in the analysis are nonstationary but share the 
same order of integration (e.g., I(1) behavior), 
then they might approach the same stochas­
tic trend. In this case a linear combination 
of the variables could form a long-run equi­
librium relationship that is stationary, and a 
linear regression of MFP on the research stock 
variables would result in consistent parame­
ter estimates. Indeed, if the series were I(1) 
and cointegrated, then the estimates would be 
superconsistent. Stock (1987) showed that such 
estimates converge to their probability limits 
faster than least squares estimates in stationary 
time-series models. 
To establish whether our models produce 
consistent parameter estimates, we proceeded 
by ﬁrst examining the data for the presence 
of a unit root and then establishing whether 
a cointegrating relationship exists between 
the variables. As a starting point, we applied 
augmented Dickey–Fuller tests on a state-by­
state basis for the three variables of interest, 
ln MFPi,t , ln SKi,t , and ln SSi,t . Most of the state-
speciﬁc data indicated the presence of a unit 
root, with the ln MFPi,t series indicating a unit 
root in 41 of the 48 states, ln SKi,t in 36, and 
ln SSi,t in all 48.13 
Given the evidence of unit roots in these 
data, it is possible that a long-run equilib­
rium relationship exists between the series; 
therefore, a test of a cointegrating rela­
tionship between the variables is warranted. 
Westerlund (2007) developed a test of cointe­
gration in panel data that produces four test 
12 Additional comparisons of alternative estimators and models, 
as well as detailed diagnostic testing of the econometric models, are 
provided by Alston et al. (2010, chapter 10). 
13 In each augmented Dickey–Fuller test, we set α = 5% and 
included an intercept, trend, and three lags of the dependent 
variable. 
statistics, Gα , Gτ , Pα , and Pτ .14 Consider the 
following error-correction model with one lag 
of the dependent variable and one covariate:
(9)  yit = αi +βi1 yit−1 +δi0 xit +δi1 xit−1 
+ βi(yit−1 − δixit−1)+ uit . 
The parameter βi provides an estimate of the 
speed of adjustment toward the long-run equi­
librium, and if βi = 0, then there is no error 
correction, and thus no cointegrating relation­
ship between the variables. The Gα and Gτ test 
statistics begin with a weighted average of the 
state-speciﬁc βi parameters and their t-ratios 
and test the null hypothesis that βi = 0 for all i 
versus the alternative that βi < 0 for at least 
one i.The  Pα and Pτ test statistics pool the sam­
ple over all the states and test the null hypothe­
sis that βi = 0 for all i versus the alternative that 
βi = β < 0 for all i. If the observations are cor­
related between cross-sectional units (states), 
robust critical values can be obtained through 
a bootstrapping procedure. Table 3 reproduces 
the panel data tests of cointegration developed 
by Westerlund (2007, table 7), including the 
group mean, Gα and Gτ , as well as the pooled 
test statistics, Pα and Pτ . Panel (a) of table 3 
shows the test results between ln MFPi,t and 
ln SKi,t , and panel (b) shows the test results 
between ln MFPi,t and ln SSi,t . 
The null hypothesis of these tests is that 
there is no cointegration between the variables. 
The results of the Westerlund tests generally 
indicate that a cointegrating relationship exists 
between MFP and the research stock variables. 
The only results indicating rejection of a cointe­
grating relation are the bootstrapped versions 
of Gα and Pα between ln MFPi,t and ln SSi,t , but 
these results are not as robust as the tau ver­
sions of the tests, which indicate that a cointe­
grating relationship does exist.15 Furthermore, 
the 48-state average value of the estimated 
speed-of-adjustment parameters (i.e., the βˆi 
parameters) is equal to −0.71 in the panel (a) 
results, and −0.83 in the panel (b) results.16 The 
test results in table 3 provide convincing evi­
dence that the models speciﬁed in logarithms 
produce superconsistent parameter estimates. 
14 See also Persyn and Westerlund (2008) for additional details 
about this test and its implementation in Stata. 
15 Based on Monte Carlo simulations assuming cross-sectional 
dependence,Westerlund (2007,p. 730) reported that:“At [a]tAt not 
[a]t one end of the scale, we have the Gτ and Pτ tests,which actually 
appear to be quite robust to the cross-sectional correlation.” 
16 These results pertain to the models that do not correct for 
contemporaneous correlation among the states. 
Table 3. Results from Panel Data Tests of 
Cointegration 
Robust 
Statistic Value Z-value P-value P-value 
Panel (a): Tests between ln MFPi,t and ln SKi,t 
(average AIC selected lag length is 2.04 years) 
Gτ −3.93 −16.64 0.00 0.00 
Gα −12.32 −6.55 0.00 0.00 
Pτ −21.60 −11.24 0.00 0.00 
Pα −11.11 −10.20 0.00 0.00 
Panel (b): Tests between ln MFPi,t and ln SSi,t 
(average AIC selected lag length is 2.25 years) 
Gτ −4.32 −19.67 0.00 0.00 
Gα −10.26 −3.91 0.00 0.26 
Pτ −22.45 −12.08 0.00 0.00 
Pα −8.85 −6.78 0.00 0.16 
Notes: AIC = Akaike information criterion. All calculations were done using 
Stata and the “xtwest” command. The null hypothesis is that there is no coin­
tegration. In each test we included an intercept term and set the lag length 
according to the average AIC. The robust P-values correct for cross-sectional 
dependence among the states using a bootstrapping procedure. One hundred 
replications were used for the bootstrapping procedure, and the lag length was 
set to one. 
Finally, the formal statistical test results are 
supported by the empirical observation that 
our models, speciﬁed either in logarithmic or 
in growth-rate form, produce similar results in 
terms of the estimated elasticities. 
Marginal Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios—Base-Model 
Results 
We used the estimated productivity model to 
compute the marginal beneﬁt associated with 
various hypothetical (counterfactual) changes 
in research investments. Speciﬁcally, we com­
puted the state-speciﬁc and national beneﬁts 
from a small ($1,000) change in 1950 in expen­
ditures (a) on research by a particular state, 
(b) on extension by a particular state, or (c) 
on USDA intramural research by the federal 
government. In computing the national bene­
ﬁts, we took into account that both federal and 
state-speciﬁc research investments have effects 
on all the states.17 
The gross annual research beneﬁts (GARB) 
to state i in year t were computed using the 
following approximation: 
(10) GARBi,t = ln MFPi,tVi,t 
17 This explicit simulation approach is less prone to error or mis­
interpretation than is an analytically derived approximation to a 
rate of return, as some studies have used. 
  
 
 
 
where Vi,t is the real value (in year 2000 
dollars) of agricultural production in state i 
in year t, and ln MFPi,t is the proportional 
change in estimated agricultural productivity 
in state i in year t, associated with the sim­
ulated $1,000 increase in spending in 1950.18 
Since the variables are in logarithms, the sim­
ulated proportional change in MFP is simply 
equal to ln MFP = ln MFP1 – ln MFP0,where 
the superscript 0 denotes the predicted ln MFP 
given the actual research expenditure and the 
superscript 1 denotes the predicted ln MFP 
with the increased (counterfactual) expendi­
ture. Then, the present value in the year 2002 
of beneﬁts accruing to state i (PVBi) was com­
puted using a (correspondingly real) discount 
rate of r = 3% per year: 
2002 
2002−t(11) PVBi = GARBi,t (1 + r)
t=1950 
2002 
2002−t= ln MFPi,tVi,t(1 + r) . 
t=1950 
The beneﬁt-cost ratio for that $1,000 invest­
ment is given by dividing the present value 
of beneﬁts by the present value of the costs: 
PVC = $1, 000(1 + r)53(= $4, 650 for r = 3%). 
Hence,marginal beneﬁt-cost ratios (or beneﬁts 
per dollar of additional expenditure) were 
computed as Bhi /C
h = PVBih/$4, 650, where i 
the superscript h denotes which of (a) one 
of the 48 state-speciﬁc research expenditures, 
(b) one of the 48 state-speciﬁc extension 
expenditures, or (c) federal research expen­
ditures was increased by $1,000 in 1950 
to generate the stream of beneﬁts being 
evaluated. 
18 This approximation is likely to be reasonably valid as a mea­
sure of the total beneﬁts for a small research-induced change in 
production, as a result of a comparatively small change in research 
investment. However, to the extent that these marginal changes 
in research spending induce price changes, the beneﬁts will be 
distributed between producers and consumers, depending on the 
elasticities of supply and demand, and this might imply differences 
in the spatial distribution of beneﬁts, compared with our analysis 
that implicitly presumes that all of the beneﬁts are enjoyed within 
the innovating state (i.e., accruing to producers or assuming an 
absence of interstate and international trade). This distortion will 
itself be unevenly distributed. Some states produce commodities 
for which the United States as a whole does not appreciably inﬂu­
ence the world price, let alone an individual state; but California, 
for instance, signiﬁcantly inﬂuences world prices for a substantial 
share of its production, and a sizable share of its production is con­
sumed in other states. This means that there are greater spillovers 
of California’s research beneﬁts than for most other states, driven 
by price changes, which we have not accounted for here. 
We computed marginal beneﬁt-cost ratios 
for increases in investments in research con­
ducted by any of the 48 State Agricultural 
Experiment Stations (SAESs) or by the USDA 
itself.19 Table 4 summarizes the beneﬁt-cost 
ratios in terms of the regional averages (rep­
resenting the simple average of the entries 
for the states within each region), the min­
imum, maximum, and simple average across 
the 48 states, and state-speciﬁc entries for 
some selected states (California, Minnesota, 
and Wyoming) for the base model (the top-
ranked model 1 in table 2). In table 4, for 
each state and for each region, the entries in 
columns (1) and (2) are measures of the bene­
ﬁts, per dollar of expenditure, accruing to that 
state (column (1), the own-state beneﬁts) and 
the nation as a whole (column (2), both the 
own-state beneﬁts and the spillover beneﬁts to 
the other 47 states) from an increase in state-
speciﬁc research spending; column (3) shows 
the beneﬁts accruing to each state, or region, 
or the country as a whole from an increase in 
USDA intramural research expenditures.20 All 
of these ﬁgures are in common terms, express­
ing real, marginal beneﬁts per dollar invested 
(associated with a small change in expenditure 
in 1950). 
Within a row in table 4, comparing columns 
(1) and (2), we can compare the own-state pay­
off to that state from investing in research and 
extension versus the payoff to the nation as 
a whole; the difference between these two is 
the spillover beneﬁt per dollar. This compari­
son indicates the magnitude of the distortion 
in incentives for a state to conduct the quan­
tity and mixture of agricultural research that 
19 Here SAES research is used as a shorthand for the funds 
(from all sources) spent on research undertaken by the SAESs and 
selected other cooperating institutions in the same state. Thus, for 
each state, we included research spending by the SAESs (includ­
ing the 1890 colleges) and the state-speciﬁc veterinary medicine 
schools. We excluded from our intramural USDA series research 
spending by the state-speciﬁc forestry schools (for symmetry with 
the coverage of our agricultural productivity series) and likewise 
omitted forestry-related research spending. The cooperating state 
institutions report their expenditures to USDA’s Current Research 
Information System (CRIS) on a voluntary basis, and so the readily 
obtainable data are neither complete nor reported in a consistent 
fashion (from year to year and among states). We did a consider­
able amount of work to clean up erroneous and sometimes large 
reporting problems with the CRIS data for these state-speciﬁc 
cooperating institutions. The extension series is an estimate of total 
funding (from all sources) for state cooperative extension work 
obtained from a variety of published and unpublished sources. See 
Alston et al. (2010, pp. 229–236) for more details. 
20 Because the base model treats state-speciﬁc research and 
extension symmetrically, the own-state beneﬁt-cost ratio for SAES 
research in any state is the same as the own-state beneﬁt-cost ratio 
for extension; the same is true for the national beneﬁt-cost ratios 
for state government expenditures on research and extension. 
Table 4. Marginal Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios for 
Research and Extension 
Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios 
State Research and 
Extension 
Own-State National 
USDA 
Intramural 
Research 
State or Region (1) (2) (3) 
Total 
48 States 
Average 
Minimum 
Maximum 
21.0 
2.4 
57.8 
Ratio 
32.1 
9.9 
69.2 
17.5 
0.4 
0.0 
1.6 
Selected States 
California 
Minnesota 
Wyoming 
33.3 
40.6 
12.7 
43.4 
55.4 
23.6 
1.4 
0.8 
0.1 
Regions 
Paciﬁc 
Mountain 
N Plains 
S Plains 
Central 
Southeast 
Northeast 
21.8 
20.0 
42.4 
20.2 
33.7 
15.1 
9.4 
32.9 
31.6 
54.5 
31.0 
46.8 
26.7 
18.4 
0.6 
0.1 
0.5 
0.5 
0.8 
0.3 
0.1 
Notes: Based on model ranked 1 in table 2. 
will generate the greatest national payoff, if 
it attaches no value to interstate spillouts of 
its research results. In California, for instance, 
the marginal own-state payoff is $33.3 per dol­
lar and the marginal national payoff is $43.4 
per dollar; for Minnesota, the corresponding 
ﬁgures are $40.6 and $55.4 per dollar; for 
Wyoming, $12.7 and $23.6 per dollar.21 
The own-state and national beneﬁt-cost 
ratios vary considerably among states. The 
own-state beneﬁt-cost ratio for state research 
and extension ranges from 2.4:1 to 57.8:1, 
around an average of 21.0:1. Similarly, the 
national beneﬁt-cost ratios range from 9.9:1 
to 69.2:1, around an average of 32.1:1. The 
spillover beneﬁts are relatively constant across 
the states, and thus variation in the own-
state beneﬁts drives most of the interstate 
differences in national beneﬁts from SAES 
research and extension. Hence, spillovers typi­
cally represent a smaller share of the total ben­
eﬁts in those states where own-state beneﬁts 
21 Rounding to the nearest whole dollar arguably conveys the 
appropriate degree of precision of these estimates, but we report 
them here and elsewhere in the text to one decimal place to 
facilitate cross-referencing with the relevant table. 
are comparatively large. Spillover beneﬁts to 
other states are worth $6–$16 per dollar spent 
on research; and in some states—especially 
states having small agricultural sectors—the 
spillover beneﬁts account for the majority 
of the national beneﬁts. USDA intramural 
research yielded a national beneﬁt-cost ratio 
of 17.5:1, generally lower than the national 
beneﬁt-cost ratio for research and extension 
conducted by states. 
Effects of Alternative Speciﬁcation Choices 
We tried a range of variations in the model 
speciﬁcation, including (a) different functional 
forms for the model (linear rather than log­
arithmic, and estimated in ﬁrst-differences or 
growth rates rather than in levels), (b) differen­
tial treatment of the lag structure for extension 
compared with research (including a 4-year 
geometric lag for extension rather than the 50­
year gamma lag as used for research, with or 
without allowing interstate spillovers of exten­
sion effects), (c) a different lag distribution 
shape (a 35-year trapezoidal lag model, as used 
by Huffman and Evenson [1993] rather than a 
50-year gamma lag model), (d) different speci­
ﬁcations of the spillover relationship (including 
models with no spillovers or spillovers based on 
proximity according to USDA regions rather 
than our model based on the similarity of 
commodity composition), and (e) alternative 
restrictions on the maximum lag length for 
research. Combining all of these variations 
implied a large number of alternative speciﬁ­
cations to be estimated and compared. Based 
on an evaluation of the statistical performance 
of the models and other implications, we gen­
erally favor the base model, in logarithms, over 
all the alternatives. The speciﬁcation choice 
that had the most profound implications for 
the estimates was the choice of a linear versus 
logarithmic functional form, and our statistical 
tests clearly favored the logarithmic speciﬁca­
tion, which has been the standard choice in 
published work. 
In table 5 we present the results from a 
selection of alternative models, summarized 
in terms of the own-state and national bene­
ﬁts from research and extension conducted by 
individual states, as well as the national beneﬁt 
from USDA intramural research. In each case, 
as appropriate, we present the results using the 
best-ﬁtting gamma distribution for the partic­
ular model speciﬁcation. Across all the mod­
els summarized in table 5, some consistent 
Table 5. Effects of Speciﬁcation Choices on Marginal Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios
 
National Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio for 
Own-State Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio 
for SAES Research SAES Research USDA Research 
Model Min. Max. Average Min. Max. Average Total 
Ratio 
Functional Form 
Logarithmic 2.4 57.8 21.0 9.9 69.2 32.1 17.5 
Growth (ﬁrst-difference 1.4 29.4 10.7 15.9 52.1 32.2 33.7 
logarithmic) 
Linear 0.2 43.9 10.0 14.2 74.4 39.7 47.0 
First-difference linear 0.2 51.3 11.2 16.7 84.5 46.3 55.4 
Extension Treatment 
50 gamma lags with 2.4 57.8 21.0 9.9 69.2 32.1 17.5 
spillovers 
50 gamma lags without 2.3 55.9 20.3 14.1 73.6 37.7 27.3 
spillovers 
4 geom. lags with spillovers 1.3 27.8 9.3 16.2 50.5 31.4 34.7 
4 geom. lags without 1.3 28.5 9.5 23.9 64.5 42.7 52.0 
spillovers 
Lag Distribution for Research (R) 
and Extension (E) 
50-year gamma, R&E 2.4 57.8 21.0 9.9 69.2 32.1 17.5 
35-year trap., R&E 3.4 53.5 19.8 18.0 75.4 41.2 33.6 
50-year gamma, R; 4-year 1.3 27.8 9.3 16.2 50.5 31.4 34.7 
geom., E 
35-year trap., R; 4-year 2.2 34.0 11.8 20.2 61.0 38.2 41.3 
geom., E 
Spillovers 
Based on output mix 2.4 57.8 21.0 9.9 69.2 32.1 17.5 
Based on USDA regions 2.3 48.5 17.6 6.6 62.4 24.8 60.5 
No spillovers 4.5 90.0 33.7 4.5 90.0 33.7 n/a 
Research Lag Length 
50-year gamma, R&E 2.4 57.8 21.0 9.9 69.2 32.1 17.5 
35-year gamma, R&E 2.4 56.7 20.4 11.7 71.0 20.4 21.9 
20-year gamma, R&E 2.5 39.5 14.8 17.2 63.0 36.3 33.7 
50-year gamma, R; 4-year 1.3 27.8 9.3 16.2 50.5 31.4 34.7 
geom., E 
35-year gamma, R; 4-year 1.1 27.0 8.8 15.3 48.9 30.1 33.4 
geom., E 
20-year gamma, R; 4-year 1.7 29.4 10.4 17.6 55.0 33.7 36.6 
geom., E 
Note: trap. = trapezoid; geom. = geometric. 
patterns emerge in the estimates. First, the 
different models imply a range of estimates for 
the social beneﬁt-cost ratio for USDA intra­
mural research, but in every model the ratio is 
much greater than 1.0. Second,in every case the 
national beneﬁt-cost ratios for SAES research 
are much greater than 1.0 in every state,and the 
average values across the 48 states are quite 
large. Third, the national beneﬁt-cost ratios 
for SAES research are large relative to the 
own-state beneﬁt-cost ratios. In all but two of 
the models (the linear model in levels or in 
ﬁrst-difference form), the marginal own-state 
beneﬁt-cost ratio was greater than 1.0 in every 
state, and the average value across the 48 states 
was much greater than 1.0 in every model. 
The different models do imply very different 
ranges of estimates of beneﬁt-cost ratios for 
SAES research among the states, but the over­
all range is much smaller when we leave out the 
clearly misspeciﬁed models that were included 
for illustrative purposes. 
The implication of these results is that spec­
iﬁcation choices do inﬂuence the results, but 
not in ways that change the primary mes­
sages. The marginal social beneﬁts from agri­
cultural research and extension are generally 
very large relative to the costs, though the 
beneﬁt-cost ratios vary among states system­
atically depending on the characteristics of the 
states; and the spillover beneﬁts are an impor­
tant component of the total beneﬁts, such that 
the national beneﬁts are much greater than the 
own-state beneﬁts from SAES research and 
extension, with the implication that individ­
ual states can be expected to underinvest in 
these activities from a national perspective. If 
accurate, these high own-state and even higher 
national beneﬁt-cost ratios represent evidence 
of past underinvestment by both the state 
and federal governments in public agricultural 
research. 
Credibility of Results 
Our measures of beneﬁt-cost ratios are large, 
and it is natural to be skeptical. One way 
to address that skepticism is to set aside 
the complex models and simply compute the 
value of the growth in agricultural productiv­
ity and compare it with the cost of agricultural 
research. In this section we present simple mea­
sures of this nature, which abstract from the 
issues of spatial spillovers and R&D lags that 
were central to our econometric analysis. 
The Value of Productivity Growth 
Over the period 1949–2002, our index of MFP 
more than doubled, from 100 in 1949 to about 
257 in 2002, and if aggregate input had been 
held constant at the 1949 quantities, output 
would have increased by a factor of 2.6:1. 
Of the actual output in 2002, only 39% (i.e., 
100/257 = 0.39) could be accounted for by 
conventional inputs using 1949 technology, 
holding productivity constant. The remaining 
61% is accounted for by economies of scale 
along with improvements in infrastructure 
and inputs and other technological changes. 
Hence, of the total production value, worth 
$173.3 billion in 2002, only 39%, or $67.3 bil­
lion, could be accounted for by conventional 
inputs using 1949 technology, and the remain­
ing $106.0 billion is attributable to the factors 
that gave rise to improved productivity.Among 
these factors is new technology, developed and 
adopted as a result of agricultural research and 
extension. 
The actual value of agricultural output (AVt ) 
can be divided into two parts: (a) one repre­
senting what the value of output would have 
been, given the actual input quantities, if pro­
ductivity had not grown since 1949—i.e., the 
hypothetical value, HVt = AVt × (100/MFPt); 
and (b) another, a residual, representing the 
value of additional output attributable to pro­
ductivity growth—i.e., residual value, RVt = 
AVt − HVt = AVt × (MFPt − 100)/MFPt . As  
productivity increases over time, the share of 
the value of production attributable to produc­
tivity growth increases. Among the 48 states, 
the share of the total value of agricultural 
output in 2002 attributable to growth in pro­
ductivity since 1949 averaged 58% but ranged 
from as low as 36% (Wyoming) to as high as 
79% (Mississippi). 
To summarize the stream of values of agri­
cultural output attributable to productivity 
improvements, the yearly residual values, RVt 
(deﬁned above), were expressed in constant 
(2000) dollars. The deﬂated values were com­
pounded at a real interest rate of 3% per 
annum and evaluated in the year 2002. The 
resulting stream of values of agricultural out­
put attributable to productivity improvements 
is equivalent to a onetime payment of more 
than $7.4 trillion in 2002, an enormous beneﬁt 
from improved agricultural productivity in the 
United States during the post-WWII period. 
Approximate Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios 
We compared the value of productivity gains 
since 1949 compounded forward over 54 years 
to 2002 with the expenditures on agricultural 
research and extension during 1929–1982 com­
pounded forward to 2002. Both costs and ben­
eﬁts were converted into real terms using the 
GDP price deﬂator and accumulated forward 
to 2002 using a real discount rate of 3% per 
annum. 
The simple ratios of approximate beneﬁts in 
2002 to approximate costs in 2002 are biased 
estimates of the true beneﬁt-cost ratios for 
several reasons. First, the existence of long 
R&D lags means that we have left out some 
of the relevant costs (research expenditures 
prior to 1929 will have contributed to pro­
ductivity growth between 1949 and 2002) and 
some of the relevant beneﬁts (research expen­
ditures between 1949 and 1982 will generate 
beneﬁts for many years after 2002). Depend­
ing on the pattern of beneﬁts and costs over 
time and the effects of discounting, these two 
sources of bias could be offsetting. However, 
given the generally rising pattern of research 
expenditures and the annual ﬂows of bene­
ﬁts from productivity gains, we would expect 
the effect of the understatement of beneﬁts 
to outweigh the effect of the understatement 
of costs, biasing the beneﬁt-cost ratios down 
on balance. Second, a signiﬁcant share, per­
haps as much as half of the total beneﬁts, 
may be attributable to private and rest-of­
world research. Third, spillover effects mean 
that some of a state’s productivity growth will 
be attributable to expenditures by other states 
and the federal government; conversely, some 
of the national beneﬁts from a state’s research 
expenditures will accrue as productivity gains 
in other states. In estimates at the regional 
level, the distortions associated with omitting 
state-to-state spillovers will be much smaller, 
and in estimates at the national level they will 
be absent. 
In table 6 we compare estimates of approx­
imate average beneﬁt-cost ratios with the pre­
ferred estimates of marginal social beneﬁt-cost 
ratios derived from the econometric estima­
tion. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimates of 
marginal private and social beneﬁt-cost ratios 
from the econometric model (as in table 4), 
while columns (3) and (4) show the approxi­
mate measures, comparing beneﬁts over 1949– 
2002 with costs over 1929–1982, and allowing 
for either 100% or only 50% of the total ben­
eﬁts to be attributed to the public agricultural 
research and extension expenditures included 
in the measure of cost. The approximate mea­
sure of the national beneﬁt-cost ratio could be 
as high as 25.6 (the upper bound with 100% 
attribution, in column (3)) or as low as 12.8 
(our lower bound with 50% attribution, in col­
umn (4)). In column (3), the corresponding 
upper-bound estimates of regional beneﬁt-cost 
ratios range from 18.1 to 63.6; the state-speciﬁc 
beneﬁt-cost ratios range from 5.4 to 77.7, and 
the simple average of these 48 estimates is 
30.4. In column (4), the corresponding lower-
bound estimates of regional beneﬁt-cost ratios 
range from 9.0 to 31.8;the state-speciﬁc beneﬁt-
cost ratios range from 2.7 to 38.8, and the 
simple average of these 48 estimates is 15.2. 
The estimates of marginal social beneﬁt-cost 
ratios in column (2) are remarkably similar to 
the estimates of approximate average beneﬁt-
cost ratios with 100% attribution in column 
Table 6. Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios: Approximations versus Econometric Estimates
 
Econometric Model, Marginal 
Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio 
Approximate Average 
Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio 
Costs 1929–1982, Beneﬁts 1949–2002 
State or Region 
State R&E 
(own-state) 
(1) 
State R&E 
(national) 
(2) 
100% Attribution 
(3) 
50% Attribution 
(4) 
48 States 
Ratio 
Average 
Minimum 
Maximum 
21.0 
2.4 
57.8 
32.1 
9.9 
69.2 
30.4 
5.4 
77.7 
15.2 
2.7 
38.8 
Selected States 
California 33.3 43.4 48.5 24.2 
Minnesota 
Wyoming 
40.6 
12.7 
55.4 
23.6 
55.6 
17.0 
27.8 
8.5 
Regions 
Paciﬁc 
Mountain 
21.8 
20.0 
32.9 
31.6 
41.1 
30.5 
20.5 
15.3 
N Plains 
S Plains 
Central 
42.4 
20.2 
33.7 
54.5 
31.0 
46.8 
63.6 
27.3 
40.6 
31.8 
13.6 
20.3 
Southeast 
Northeast 
15.1 
9.4 
26.7 
18.4 
28.6 
18.1 
14.3 
9.0 
United States (includes USDA intramural) 
USDA intramural 17.5 
25.6  12.8 
Notes: SAES = State Agricultural Experiment Station; R&E = research and extension. 
Table 7. Terminal Values Implied by Various Rates of Return
 
Rate of Return, % per Annum 
Number of Years from 
Initial Investment 10 20 50 
20 
35 
40 
50 
7 
28 
45 
117 
Terminal Value, Dollars of Beneﬁt 
per Dollar of Initial Investment 
38 
591 
1,470 
9,100 
3,325 
1,456,110 
11,057,332 
637,621,500 
Note: Sources developed by the authors. 
(3), while the estimates of state-speciﬁc (pri­
vate) marginal beneﬁt-cost ratios in column (1) 
are more comparable to the approximate aver­
age beneﬁt-cost ratios with 50% attribution in 
column (4). 
Recalibrating Rates of Return to Agricultural 
R&D 
We prefer to use beneﬁt-cost ratios, but the 
preponderance of precedent literature reports 
internal rates of returns. Having conducted a 
meta-analysis of 292 studies that reported esti­
mates of returns to agricultural R&D, Alston 
et al. (2000, p. 55, table 12) reported an overall 
mean internal rate of return for their sam­
ple of 1,852 estimates of 81.3% per annum, 
with a mode of 40% and a median of 44.3%. 
After dropping some outliers and incomplete 
observations, they conducted regression anal­
ysis using a sample of 1,128 estimates with a 
mean of 64.6%, a mode of 28%, and a median 
of 42.0%. The main mass of the distribution of 
internal rates of return reported in the litera­
ture is between 20% and 80% per annum.22 
Other reviews of the literature may not have 
covered the same studies or done so in the same 
ways but nevertheless reached similar gen­
eral conclusions—for instance, Evenson (2002) 
and Fuglie and Heisey (2007). In a recent 
report distilling the evidence for the Coun­
cil for Agricultural Science and Technology, 
Huffman, Norton and Tweeten (2011, p. 6) reit­
erated the typical ﬁnding but reported a point 
estimate as follows: 
22 When characterizing the evidence from the literature, 
economists often use a range like this,but more often it is a narrower 
one with a smaller mean (such as the 20%–60% range reported by 
Fuglie and Heisey [2007]). As discussed by Alston et al. (2000), 
such selective reporting of the literature may be misleading, giving 
a false impression of both the average and the size of the range 
around it. 
Numerous in-depth studies at the 
University of Chicago, Yale Uni­
versity, Iowa State University, the 
University of Minnesota, and else­
where have carefully calculated the 
rate of return to investing in pub­
lic agricultural research. Focusing 
on the contribution of productivity-
oriented agricultural research under­
taken by the main U.S. public 
agricultural research institutions— 
SAESs, [veterinary medical centers], 
[Agricultural Research Service], and 
[Economic Research Service]—to 
agricultural productivity in the 48 
contiguous states, including spillover 
effects to other states in the same 
geoclimatic region,during 1970–2004, 
the marginal real rate of return is 
approximately 50% (Huffman 2010; 
Huffman and Evenson 2006a,b). 
It is easy to show that a 50% rate of return is 
implausible for a long-term investment yield­
ing beneﬁts that compound over 35 years (as 
in Huffman 2010 and Huffman and Evenson 
2006a, 2006b) let alone over 50 years, which we 
have found is more appropriate for U.S. pub­
lic agricultural R&D. Table 7 includes some 
sample calculations of the terminal values of 
investments of one dollar over various time 
periods using alternative real rates of return to 
illustrate this point. One dollar invested at 50% 
per annum would be worth more than $3,000 
at the end of 20 years, nearly $1.5 million at the 
end of 35 years, and a whopping $637 million at 
the end of 50 years. To provide some perspec­
tive, if the roughly $4 billion invested in public 
agricultural R&D in 2005 earned a return of 
50% per annum compounding over 35 years, 
by 2040 the accumulated beneﬁts would be 
worth $5,824,000 billion (2000 prices)—more 
than 100 times the projected U.S. GDP in 2040 
Table 8. Conventional and Modiﬁed Internal Rates of Return
 
Conventional Internal Rate Modiﬁed Internal Rate 
of Return (IRR) of Return (MIRR) 
State R&E State R&E State R&E State R&E 
(own-state) (national) (own-state) (national) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percent per Year 
48 States 
Average 18.9 22.7 8.8 9.9 
Minimum 7.4 15.3 4.8 7.7 
Maximum 27.6 29.1 11.4 11.7 
Selected States 
California 24.1 26.1 10.2 10.7 
Minnesota 24.7 27.3 10.6 11.3 
Wyoming 16.8 20.9 8.2 9.5 
Regions 
Paciﬁc 20.2 23.5 9.1 10.1 
Mountain 19.0 22.7 8.9 10.0 
N Plains 24.9 27.0 10.7 11.2 
S Plains 19.5 22.7 9.0 10.0 
Central 23.1 25.9 10.1 10.8 
Southeast 17.6 22.0 8.3 9.7 
Northeast 14.0 19.0 7.2 8.8 
Notes: R&E = research and extension. The ﬁgures in columns (3) and (4) are modiﬁed internal rates of return assuming a 3% reinvestment rate. 
and more than 10 times the projected global 
GDP in 2040.23 Clearly, as these ﬁgures illus­
trate, a 50% rate of return compounding over a 
long period of time is implausible. Perhaps this 
fact may help account for why the very large 
estimates have been discounted and ignored 
by some policymakers. Even a 10% real rate 
of return yields a large terminal value when 
compounded over 35 or 50 years. 
We computed conventional internal rates 
of return using the same streams of beneﬁts 
and costs simulated by the base-model that 
we used to compute the beneﬁt-cost ratios 
reported in table 4. The internal rate of return 
is by deﬁnition the discount rate that makes 
the present value of the beneﬁts equal to the 
present value of the costs. Summary results 
are reported in table 8, in columns (1) and 
(2), while more detailed results for all the 
states are presented in table 9. Relative to the 
mainstream of the literature,our preferred log­
arithmic model yielded estimates at the lower 
end of the range for both social and private 
annual rates of return to state and federal agri­
cultural R&D—around 20%. Speciﬁcally, our 
23 Fogel (2007) forecasted that U.S. GDP would reach $41,944 
billion in 2040 and that global GDP would reach $307,857 billion 
(2000 purchasing power parity prices). 
estimates of own-state rates of return ranged 
from 7.4% to 27.6%, with an average of 18.9% 
per annum across the states, and the estimates 
of national rates of return ranged from 15.3% 
to 29.1%, with an average of 22.7% per annum 
across the states. 
Our estimates of conventional internal rates 
of return in columns (1) and (2) of table 8 are 
much smaller than those reported typically— 
for instance, the 50% annual rate of return 
reported by Huffman, Norton and Tweeten 
(2011). Even so,we think our own measures are 
unrealistically high—for a conceptual reason 
as well as because of their unrealistic implica­
tions as indicated in table 7. Speciﬁcally, the 
conventional internal rate of return implic­
itly assumes that the ﬂows of beneﬁts can be 
reinvested at the same rate as the investment 
being evaluated. It is suited for a situation 
where those entities that would pay the cost 
would also reap the returns, whereas in the 
present context the government pays the cost 
but the beneﬁts accrue to producers and con­
sumers of farm products. In our application, 
if a public research investment is to earn a 
rate of return of 50% per annum, the conven­
tional calculation will be correct only if the 
farmers and consumers to whom the streams 
of beneﬁts accrue can (and do) invest their 
net beneﬁts at the same 50% rate of return. 
Table 9. Marginal Beneﬁt-Cost Ratios and Internal Rates of Return
 
Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio Internal Rate of Return MIRR 
State R&E State R&E USDA State R&E State R&E State R&E State R&E 
(own-state) (national) intramural (own-state) (national) (own-state) (national) 
State or Region (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ratio Percent per Year 
Paciﬁc 21.8  32.9 0.6  20.2  23.5 9.1  10.1 
California 33.3 43.4 1.4 24.1 26.1 10.2 10.7 
Oregon 11.3 24.1 0.2 16.3 21.3 7.9 9.5 
Washington 20.9 31.2 0.3 20.3 23.1 9.2 10.0 
Mountain 20.0  31.6 0.1  19.0  22.7 8.9  10.0 
Arizona 26.6 36.9 0.2 22.1 24.5 9.7 10.4 
Colorado 31.1 43.8 0.3 22.5 25.2 10.0 10.8 
Idaho 34.0 44.8 0.2 23.3 25.5 10.2 10.8 
Montana 22.0 32.2 0.2 20.4 23.1 9.3 10.1 
Nevada 7.3 19.2 0.0 13.0 19.1 7.0 9.0 
New Mexico 15.6 28.2 0.1 18.1 22.2 8.6 9.8 
Utah 11.0 24.5 0.1 16.0 21.3 7.9 9.5 
Wyoming 12.7 23.6 0.1 16.8 20.9 8.2 9.5 
N Plains 42.4  54.5 0.5  24.9  27.0  10.7  11.2 
Kansas 33.6 45.3 0.7 23.3 25.6 10.2 10.8 
Nebraska 51.3 64.9 0.8 26.3 28.4 11.1 11.6 
North Dakota 37.3 46.0 0.3 23.8 25.5 10.4 10.9 
South Dakota 47.4 61.7 0.4 26.3 28.4 10.9 11.5 
S Plains 20.2  31.0 0.5  19.5  22.7 9.0  10.0 
Arkansas 26.8 35.7 0.4 21.4 23.6 9.7 10.3 
Louisiana 12.2 23.0 0.2 16.8 21.0 8.1 9.4 
Mississippi 15.1 25.3 0.3 18.3 21.7 8.5 9.6 
Oklahoma 19.0 31.4 0.3 19.1 22.8 9.0 10.1 
Texas 28.2 39.4 1.1 21.9 24.5 9.8 10.5 
Central 33.7  46.8 0.8  23.1  25.9  10.1  10.8 
Illinois 43.0 53.8 1.3 25.1 27.0 10.7 11.2 
Indiana 27.1 39.4 0.7 21.7 24.6 9.7 10.5 
Iowa 57.8 69.2 1.6 27.6 29.1 11.4 11.7 
Michigan 17.1 31.5 0.3 19.1 23.4 8.8 10.1 
Minnesota 40.6 55.4 0.8 24.7 27.3 10.6 11.3 
Missouri 34.7 49.9 0.6 24.3 27.1 10.3 11.0 
Ohio 22.4 37.0 0.5 20.2 24.0 9.3 10.4 
Wisconsin 26.7 38.3 0.6 22.1 24.8 9.7 10.5 
Southeast 15.1  26.7 0.3  17.6  22.0 8.3 9.7 
Alabama 13.4 24.8 0.3 17.1 21.3 8.3 9.6 
Florida 21.6 28.2 0.4 20.5 22.4 9.3 9.8 
Georgia 20.5 31.0 0.4 20.3 23.2 9.2 10.0 
Kentucky 18.5 30.5 0.3 19.2 22.8 8.9 10.0 
North Carolina 19.9 27.5 0.5 20.6 22.8 9.1 9.8 
South Carolina 11.2 23.1 0.1 16.1 20.9 7.9 9.4 
Tennessee 15.7 31.3 0.2 18.4 23.3 8.6 10.1 
Virginia 11.8 26.3 0.2 16.7 22.0 8.0 9.7 
West Virginia 3.8 17.6 0.0 9.7 18.9 5.7 8.8 
Northeast 9.4  18.4 0.1  14.0  19.0 7.2 8.8 
Connecticut 5.4 14.2 0.0 11.8 17.6 6.4 8.4 
Delaware 15.8 21.5 0.0 17.9 20.0 8.6 9.3 
Maine 13.5 20.1 0.1 17.5 20.1 8.3 9.1 
Maryland 14.1 26.1 0.1 17.5 21.7 8.4 9.7 
Massachusetts 4.7 13.3 0.0 10.8 17.0 6.1 8.2 
New Hampshire 4.4 14.0 0.0 10.6 17.5 6.0 8.4 
New Jersey 4.7 13.7 0.1 11.3 17.5 6.1 8.3 
Continued 
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Beneﬁt-Cost Ratio Internal Rate of Return MIRR 
State R&E State R&E USDA State R&E State R&E State R&E State R&E 
(own-state) (national) intramural (own-state) (national) (own-state) (national) 
State or Region (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
New York 8.3 18.1 0.3 14.2 19.1 7.3 8.9 
Pennsylvania 18.0 30.3 0.3 19.1 22.8 8.9 10.0 
Rhode Island 2.4 9.9 0.0 7.4 15.3 4.8 7.7 
Vermont 12.4 21.5 0.0 16.2 20.0 8.1 9.3 
U.S. averagea 21.0  32.1 0.4  18.9  22.7 8.8 9.9 
Notes: R&E = research and extension; MIRR = modiﬁed internal rate of return. The ﬁgures in columns (6) and (7) are MIRRs assuming a 3% per annum 
reinvestment rate. aAverage of 48 contiguous U.S. states. 
Kierulff (2008) provides a recent discussion 
of conventional measures of internal rates of 
return, their shortcomings, and the reason a so-
called modiﬁed version is preferred for ﬁnan­
cial analyses applied to investments that yield 
streams of revenue.24 
Consider an investment of It dollars in time 
t that will yield a ﬂow of beneﬁts, Bt+n, over the 
following N years. The conventional internal 
rate of return, i, solves the equation 
N N(12) Bt+n(1 + i)N−n − It (1 + i) = 0. 
n=0 
Alternatively, suppose the stream of beneﬁts 
would be reinvested by the beneﬁciaries (say, 
farmers or food consumers) at some exter­
nal rate of return, r, which could be different 
from the rate for the project being evaluated. 
Then we would want to solve for the modi­
ﬁed internal rate of return, m, which solves the 
problem 
N N(13) Bt+n(1 + r)N−n − It (1 + m) = 0. 
n=0 
Intuitively, m is the rate at which one could 
afford to borrow the amount to be invested, 
It , given that it would generate the ﬂow of 
beneﬁts, Bt+n, that would be reinvested at the 
external rate, r. It can be seen that the con­
ventional calculation of the internal rate of 
return is a special case of equation (13), which 
assumes r = i(= m), which is implausible for 
24 Biondi (2006) suggests that the modiﬁed internal rate of return 
concept was ﬁrst proposed by Duvillard in the late 19th century and 
was “reinvented” in the late 1950s by Solomon (1956), Hirshleifer 
(1958), and Baldwin (1959). 
public projects yielding ﬂows of beneﬁts that 
imply very large conventional internal rates of 
return. 
We computed the modiﬁed internal rates 
of return corresponding to the conventional 
internal rates of return in tables 8 and 9,assum­
ing that beneﬁts could be reinvested at a real 
rate of 3% per annum (the same rate we used 
to compute the beneﬁt-cost ratios). Summary 
results are reported in table 8, in columns (3) 
and (4), while more detailed results for all 
the states are presented in table 9. Our esti­
mates of the own-state modiﬁed internal rates 
of return ranged from 4.8% to 11.4%, with an 
average of 8.8% per annum across the states, 
while the estimates of national rates of return 
(including interstate spillovers) ranged from 
7.7% to 11.7%, with an average of 9.9% per 
annum across the states. We also computed 
the conventional internal rate of return for 
USDA intramural research, which was 18.7% 
per annum, and the corresponding modiﬁed 
internal rate of return, which was 8.7%. All of 
these modiﬁed rates of return are plausible yet 
consistent with very high beneﬁt-cost ratios. 
Conclusion 
Measures of the payoff to public agricultural 
R&D are potentially useful for policy, and 
this usefulness will be greater if the measures 
are transparent, well understood, and credible. 
The overwhelming message from the extant lit­
erature on the returns to agricultural R&D 
is that it has paid handsome dividends and 
has been underfunded—yet the underfund­
ing pattern persists. In the work reported in 
this paper, we set out to develop new evi­
dence on the returns to agricultural research 
and extension and present it in a new light. 
While our estimates apply to both research 
and extension, since they enter our model 
symmetrically, much of the previous litera­
ture has emphasized returns to agricultural 
research per se, and that is the benchmark for 
comparison. 
The work reported here entails several con­
tributions.The analysis is based on entirely new 
measures of both agricultural productivity and 
state and federal government investments in 
agricultural research and extension that were 
developed speciﬁcally for this purpose. The 
models used here are also new and different 
from those used previously in some ways that 
have implications for ﬁndings. In particular we 
tested for lag length in a ﬂexible gamma lag dis­
tribution model and, compared with typically 
used models, our preferred model suggests a 
much longer lag length,which in turn has impli­
cations for measured rates of return. In addi­
tion, we used a new approach to model spatial 
spillovers, based on the similarity of commod­
ity composition rather than spatial proximity, 
and evaluated the implications. Rather than 
simply impose a set of modeling assumptions, 
we evaluated the implications of our own 
modeling choices versus alternatives typically 
reported for ﬁndings with respect to returns to 
research.We found that some elements of spec­
iﬁcation choices had quite signiﬁcant impacts 
on ﬁndings but that the main ﬁnding was con­
sistent across models: a very high social payoff 
to the investment with very signiﬁcant state-to­
state spillover effects compounding incentive 
problems and justifying a signiﬁcant federal 
role. 
Nevertheless, the combination of speciﬁca­
tion choices in our preferred model resulted in 
a much lower conventionally measured inter­
nal rate of return to research than has been 
reported typically in previous studies. These 
comparatively low rates of return reﬂect our 
comparatively long lags and our greater atten­
tion to reducing other sources of misattribu­
tion bias that have contributed to very high 
rates of return found in some studies (as dis­
cussed by, e.g., Alston and Pardey [2001]), 
and the comparison lends credibility to our 
results. Moreover, we show that the conven­
tional internal rate of return measures are 
implausible. Our modiﬁed internal rates of 
return are much lower than the very high rates 
that are still part of the mainstream in the 
literature and being presented to policymak­
ers. These new ﬁndings regarding the prevalent 
use of a ﬂawed metric provide some empiri­
cal justiﬁcation for the skepticism sometimes 
expressed about very high estimated rates of 
return to research,which may have contributed 
in turn to skepticism about the value of the 
investment. 
To address that skepticism, we developed 
simple, approximate measures of beneﬁt-cost 
ratios. These measures are based on comparing 
the value of productivity growth with the cost 
of investments in agricultural research,without 
speciﬁcally modeling the statistical relation­
ship between productivity and spending over 
space and time, thereby avoiding the prob­
lem of speciﬁcation bias. They generate similar 
measures to those coming from the econo­
metric analysis, illustrating the point that the 
econometric estimates reﬂect the same funda­
mental forces at work. Speciﬁcally, agricultural 
productivity growth is worth many times more 
than the annual spending on agricultural R&D 
(including extension). Even if only a fraction 
is attributed to R&D, and even if the lags are 
very long, the implied beneﬁt-cost ratio will be 
very large. 
Our speciﬁc empirical results are interesting, 
but in this work we have sought to emphasize 
the insights we can draw from the overall pat­
tern and robustness of the evidence. Through­
out we have emphasized two elements: (a) 
the spatial and temporal attribution problems 
associated with modeling R&D lags and (b) 
spatial spillovers. Our results show that R&D 
lags are very long, much longer than most pre­
vious studies have allowed, which has potential 
implications for problems for policy prescrip­
tions, as well as econometric biases. Likewise, 
spatial spillovers are empirically important, 
contributing to important differences between 
state-speciﬁc and national beneﬁts from SAES 
research. Studies that do not account appropri­
ately for spillovers may suffer from economet­
ric biases and could yield inappropriate policy 
prescriptions. 
The ﬁnding of substantial interstate technol­
ogy spillovers suggests that states would under-
invest in agricultural R&D from a national 
perspective, even if they did not underinvest 
from a narrower state-speciﬁc perspective. 
Federal support for SAES research can be 
justiﬁed on these grounds. As well as providing 
a justiﬁcation for federal support of SAES 
research, spatial technology spillovers provide 
a justiﬁcation for intramural research by the 
USDA. Our results indicate that even with 
substantial support from the federal govern­
ment, most states substantially underinvest in 
agricultural R&D, in the sense that both the 
in-state and national returns well exceed the 
costs of additional investments in agricultural 
R&D; they also indicate that these institu­
tional failures continue to impose very large 
opportunity costs on individual states and the 
nation as a whole. 
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